Ethical Intuitionism
by Michael Huemer

Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

This is a page of information about my book, Ethical Intuitionism, which was published in October of 2005. Please consider buying it.

The publisher has granted permission to post the excerpts linked below. Please do not reproduce without permission of the publisher.


Analytical Contents ix
Preface xxii
1   Introduction 1
PART I   Alternative Metaethical Theories 15
2   Non-Cognitivism 17
3   Subjectivism 48
4   Reductionism 66
PART II   Ethical Intuitionism 97
5   Moral Knowledge 99
6   Disagreement and Error 128
7   Practical Reasons 155
8   Further Objections 199
9   Conclusion 224
Notes 255
References 285
Index 297


The book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or “intuition”; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. I confront the major objections to this theory, arguing that contrary to what has often been assumed, the theory does have the resources to explain moral disagreements and to offer a reasonable approach to resolving some of them. The major alternative theories, including subjectivism, nihilism, and reductionism, are shown to face decisive objections.

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