by Michael Huemer
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
This is a page of information about my book, Ethical Intuitionism, which was published in October of 2005. Please consider buying it.
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Ethical Intuitionism by Michael Huemer Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. This is a page of information about my book, Ethical Intuitionism, which was published in October of 2005. Please consider buying it. |
The publisher has granted permission to post the excerpts linked below. Please do not reproduce without permission of the publisher.
| Analytical Contents | ix |
| Preface | xxii |
| 1 Introduction | 1 |
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| PART I Alternative Metaethical Theories | 15 |
| 2 Non-Cognitivism | 17 |
| 3 Subjectivism | 48 |
| 4 Reductionism | 66 |
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| PART II Ethical Intuitionism | 97 |
| 5 Moral Knowledge | 99 |
| 6 Disagreement and Error | 128 |
| 7 Practical Reasons | 155 |
| 8 Further Objections | 199 |
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| 9 Conclusion | 224 |
| Notes | 255 |
| References | 285 |
| Index | 297 |
The book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or “intuition”; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. I confront the major objections to this theory, arguing that contrary to what has often been assumed, the theory does have the resources to explain moral disagreements and to offer a reasonable approach to resolving some of them. The major alternative theories, including subjectivism, nihilism, and reductionism, are shown to face decisive objections.