by Michael Huemer
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
This is a page of information about my book, Ethical Intuitionism, which was published in October of 2005. Please consider buying it.
The publisher has granted permission to post the excerpts linked below. Please do not reproduce without permission of the publisher.
|PART I Alternative Metaethical Theories||15|
|PART II Ethical Intuitionism||97|
|5 Moral Knowledge||99|
|6 Disagreement and Error||128|
|7 Practical Reasons||155|
|8 Further Objections||199|
The book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or “intuition”; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. I confront the major objections to this theory, arguing that contrary to what has often been assumed, the theory does have the resources to explain moral disagreements and to offer a reasonable approach to resolving some of them. The major alternative theories, including subjectivism, nihilism, and reductionism, are shown to face decisive objections.
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